Abstract. As the number of IP hijacking incidents has increased, many solutions are proposed to prevent IP hijacking, such as RPKI, BGPmon, Argus, and PHAS. However, few studies have been researched about an AS path hijacking. We proposed a novel methodology of preventing AS path hijacking by comparing live BGP streams to our policy-based database that collected from RIPE NCC repository. As the number of ASes increases, our method for comparing live BGP streams to our policy-based database have to be enhanced to validate AS path in real time.
Introduction
The initial design of BGP was a fully trust-based system. So, BGP itself does not have mechanisms to verify whether a route is valid or not because BGP routers completely trust other BGP routers. This lack of consideration of BGP vulnerabilities often causes severe failures of Internet service provision. Once a hijacking BGP router announces bogus blocks of IP addresses to BGP peers, the BGP peers transfer Internet traffic to the hijacking BGP router. We call this threat of failures IP hijacking. The most well-known IP hijacking is the YouTube hijacking by Pakistan Telecom (AS17557) on the twenty fourth of February in 2008 [1] . In order to solve the IP hijacking, many studies were conducted, such as RPKI [2] , BGPmon [3] , Argus [4] , and PHAS [5] .
While there are many studies on the IP hijacking, few studies have been researched about an AS path hijacking. There was some misdirected network traffic that was suspected of the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack in 2013 observed by Renesys. In February 2013, global traffic was redirected to Belarusian ISP GlobalOneBel before its intended destination and it occurred on an almost daily basis. Major financial institutions, governments, and network service providers were affected by this traffic diversion in several countries including the U.S. from the thirty first of July to the nineteenth of August in 2013. In order to protect the AS path hijacking, we proposed Secure AS path BGP (SAPBGP) in which the SAPBGP constructs its own policy-based database by collecting RIPE NCC repository and checks the AS_PATH attribute in BGP update messages whether the ASes listed in the AS_PATH attributes are actually connected or note. For the validation test with the real BGP messages [8] , the SAPBGP receives live BGP streams from BGPmon project [7] . As the number of devices that require an IP address increases, the number of ASes increases. As a result the SAPBGP should be able to handle a huge amount of BGP routing policy information. We enhanced our method to validate AS_PATH attributes to handle a huge amount of BGP streams.
AS Path hijacking accident
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Enhancing Secure AS path BGP (SAPBGP)
In order to prevent AS path hijacking, SIDR working group is proposing BGPsec [6] but we approached differently from BGPsec to monitor and detect the AS path hijacking by using ASes connection information using BGP peer information through policy-based database peer information. RIPE NCC provides users with RIPE Data Repository that contains BGP peer information. Through this information, we can know if any ASes are connected to other ASes. This peer information has been collected by either Routing Information Service (RIS) or Internet Routing Registry (IRR). RIS has collected and stored Internet routing data from several locations all over the world since 2001. We construct our own policy-based database by using API provided by RIPE NCC. We have collected, every day, all of the AS imports and exports policies information since the eighteenth of February in 2014. In addition, we have separated tables in the database to keep the daily information as well as the accumulated routing policy information by adding new exports and imports to the existing exports and imports in the accumulate table. BGPmon is a monitoring infrastructure, implemented by Colorado State University that collects BGP messages from various routers that are distributed and offers the BGP messages as the routes for destinations are changed in real-time [7] . Any BGP router can be a source that offers real-time update messages if the BGP router is connected to BGPmon. Currently, 9 organizations participate in the BGPmon project as a source router. As shown in Fig.2 , SAPBGP compares daily basis BGP update messages to our policy-based database. When SAPBGP collects policy information from the RIPE NCC repository, export and import polices are stored in random order. So, SAPBGP should check policy information and the complexity is O(n) in worst case. However, if the export and import polices are stored in order, SAPBGP can check policy information with binary search method and the complexity is O(log n). It takes time to keep managing policy information in order, but once the policy information is sorted, the comparison time is significantly reduced. In addition, local database of the SAPBGP will be distributed into multiple databases to stably manage policy information
Conclusions
In order to monitor the AS path hijacking, we proposed Secure AS_PATH BGP (SAPBGP) in which we monitor the AS_PATH attribute in update messages whether each AS in the AS_PATH attribute is connected to each other based on our policy database collected from RIPE NCC repository. However, as the number of devices that require an IP address increases, the number of ASes increases. As a result, the size of BGP routing table will be increased. Therefore, the SAPBGP should be able to handle a huge amount of BGP routing policy information. We enhanced our method to validate AS_PATH attributes to handle a huge amount of live BGP streams in real time.
